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NOTES

AESTHETIC ZONING: A CURRENT EVALUATION
OF THE LAW
Whether by special legislative act or by the general enabling acts
in effect in all states, municipalities may use their police power to
pass and enforce zoning ordinances of various types.' Since 1926,
when the United States Supreme Court first upheld a comprehensive
zoning ordinance in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2 there
has been no doubt that the police power could constitutionally be
utilized to restrict the use of an individual's property for the benefit
of the community in general. This community benefit has been referred to by the courts as "the general welfare" or sometimes "the
public welfare." It is essential to an understanding of the subject
area developed in this note that the nebulous quality of the term "the
general welfare" be fully understood.
There are four universally accepted purposes that justify any
use of the police power: the promotion of health, safety, morals, and
the general welfare.3 Of these four purposes, promotion of the general
welfare is the most pliable because it is not susceptible to an adequate
definition, or even delimitation. The promotion of health, safety, and
morals will provide justification for only a primitive type of zoning;
thus, comprehensive ordinances must rest upon the use of the police
power to promote the general welfare. The Supreme Court acknowledged this fact in Euclid saying: "The ordinance under review,
and all similar laws and regulations, must find their justification in
4
some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare."
Before examining the general welfare, a brief consideration of the
nature of the police power is necessary, since this is the power under
which all zoning is accomplished. The police power of municipalities is delegated by the state and, in the absence of a contrary constitutional provision, the power exercised by the municipality cannot
exceed that which the state could exercise. It must be used to promote
the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the people within
the corporate limits. Furthermore, any exercise of such power must
be constitutional and reasonable in actual operation. 5 If the use
of the police power is within the four accepted purposes and meets the
tests of constitutionality and reasonableness, it will serve as the basis
of regulation or prohibition of activities within the city. Although
these two functions overlap to some extent, regulation is thought to
1. E.g., FLA.

STAT. §§176.01-.24 (1963).
2. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. Blitch v. City of Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 623, 195 So. 406, 410 (1940).
4. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
5. See Gundling v. City of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 187 (1900).
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be less harsh, more comprehensive, and broader in scope than prohibition. Because of these qualities, a regulatory ordinance is usually
more vulnerable to an attack upon its reasonableness than upon its
constitutionality. Prohibition has the opposite characteristics: harshness, simplicity, and limited use. It is the type of brute force measure
that is circumscribed by the federal and all state constitutions. Prohibitory ordinances are frequently subject to charges that they either
deprive an individual of life, liberty, and property without affording
him due process of the laws or that they deny an individual the equal
protection of the laws. A comprehensive zoning ordinance is usually
considered to be primarily regulatory, but it nearly always embodies
some prohibitive provisions.
Until the Euclid decision, the constitutional limitations alone
were sufficient to thwart the best laid zoning ordinances of city councils; but in that case the Supreme Court introduced -without quite
admitting it - the element of utilitarianism, that is, the weighing of
the individual interest against the community interest., The Court
pointed out the desirability of a comprehensive zoning ordinance
and discussed the sundry benefits to the entire community, repeatedly
stressing that such ordinances could not operate without a certain
amount of prohibition on individual property utilization.7
In addition to the utilitarian argument, two more secure havens
exist in the sea of multifarious restrictions that apply to the use of
the police power for zoning. One is the doctrine that a court will
not review the judgment of a city council as to the necessity for
passage of a particular ordinance.8 The second is the "fairly debatable
test," which requires the court to uphold an ordinance unless reasonable men would agree that the ordinance is unreasonable. Hence,
as long as reasonable men could differ as to the reasonableness of the
ordinance, it is allowed to stand. 9
The propositions of the Supreme Court in the Euclid decision
have been echoed by most state tribunals. Among the leaders has
been the Florida Supreme Court, which gave complete approval of
Euclid in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., saying:' 10
We will determine the reasonableness of the regulations as
applied to the factual situation meanwhile keeping before us
the accepted rules that the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the city council; that the ordinance is pre6. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
7. Id. at 389.
8. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945) (Black,

J. dissenting).
9. See Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924).
10. 147 Fla. 480, 486, 3 So. 2d 364, 366 (1941).
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sumed valid . . . and that the legislative intent will be
sustained if "fairly debatable."
Before Euclid, a plaintiff who could show deprivation of property without compensation or a denial of equal protection, even to
the slightest degree, could cause the invalidation of a zoning ordinance. Since that decision, the importance of the constitutional
objections has declined for two reasons: (1) the plaintiff's burden of
proof has been increased so that he must demonstrate that the damage
to his interests exceeds the benefit to the public interests, which the
ordinance was designed to engender, and (2) the case law has been
sufficiently developed so that the constitutional issues are fairly well
settled. For this latter reason, cities that are unwilling to risk their
zoning ordinances in the face of adverse precedent often will allow the
property owner a variance or will even spot zone his property.
There are two ways by which a property owner can show that an
ordinance is unreasonable: (1) demonstrate that the means adopted
by the ordinance are neither suitable nor likely to attain the objectives of the ordinance or (2) demonstrate that the classifications within the ordinance are arbitrary. Courts often list arbitrariness and unreasonableness as distinct features that will cause the invalidity of
a zoning ordinance. 1" Although this practice has the desirable effect
of emphasizing the importance of arbitrariness, it blurs the role of
arbitrariness as proof of unreasonableness. Lawsuits contesting the
reasonableness of zoning ordinances have been greatly discouraged
by the "fairly debatable test" and the doctrine that the court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the city council. Such suits, when
successful, have usually involved cases in which the ordinance in
question was clearly arbitrary and therefore without reasonable classi12
fication.
The Euclid decision did not furnish adequate guidelines for the
courts that followed it. The Supreme Court merely stated that the
validity of the use of police power for zoning must rest upon the
vague concept of promoting the general welfare. 3 There was no attempt to define the scope of the general welfare. Nor have the state
courts provided any meaningful definition; rather, they have spoken of
what is included in general welfare in the broadest of terms. 4 The
result of the uncertainty of the scope of the general welfare was an
avalanche of litigation. From the sheer volume of cases, a common
11. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); City of
Jackson v. McPherson, 162 Miss. 164, 177, 138 So. 604, 605 (1932); Thomas Cusack
Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529 (1916).
12. See Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209, 212 (Fla. 1963).
13. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
14. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952).
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law of general welfare has begun to evolve and precedent has become
a vital part of the law of zoning.
Two concepts have emerged that are widely recognized as being
embraced by the term "general welfare": economic well-being and
spiritual comfort. The most important facet of spiritual comfort is
aesthetic zoning.
Aesthetic zoning is zoning that is intended to promote, preserve
or restore beauty, and to remove or hide eyesores. Hence, the law
of zoning is being utilized to achieve for the sense of sight what the
law of nuisance has achieved for the senses of hearing and smelling.
Viewed in a less favorable light, aesthetic zoning is the exercise of
police power to deprive the individual of the unrestrained use of his
property so that the community might have the luxury of gazing upon
pleasant surroundings. The problem facing the courts with respect
to aesthetic zoning is: does the benefit to the public, which has traditionally been thought of in terms of need, but never luxury, outweigh the damage to the individual? When the courts in the early
part of the present century applied the balance, the result was uniform; luxury (aesthetics) was one of the lightest elements to be found
upon this planet. As the Florida Supreme Court put it in Anderson
5
v. Shackieford:2
[T]he sign was neither dangerous to persons using the streets
nor to adjacent property, nor offensive to their morals, although the words, design, and coloring of the siign [sic] might
offend the aesthetic tastes of some of the citizens.

[B]ut to attempt to exercise the power depriving one of the
legitimate use of his property merely because such use offends
the aesthetic or refined taste of other persons is quite another
thing and cannot be exercised under the constitution forbidding the taking of property for a public use without compensation.
This case is representative of the distrust with which all courts viewed
aesthetic zoning at that time.
The first concession to aesthetic zoning was to allow city councils
to consider aesthetics and attempt to achieve aesthetic objectives,
but the ordinance was upheld only if it could be sustained, in its
entirety, upon nonaesthetic grounds1 6 Approximately three-fourths
of the states went along with this concession.
15.
16.

74 Fla. 36,41-43, 76 So. 843, 345 (1917). (Emphasis added.)
City of Jackson v. Bridges, 139 So. 2d 660, 664 (Miss. 1962).
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Although courts repeatedly spoke of the expansion of the scope
of general welfare, it was not until 1954, in Berman v. Parker,'7 that
the United States Supreme Court specifically included aesthetics.
Berman involved the condemnation of private property under the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. The issue was
whether this use of the police power was justified. The Court held
that the appellants' property, which was neither slum nor blighted
area, could be appropriated to develop a more attractive community.
The Court said: 18
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive....
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled.
This decision, as was expected, had a considerable impact in the
state courts.' 9 Approximately one-fourth of the states - notably
Wisconsin 20 - have been enthusiastic in approving this decision. At
least two state courts that rejected the result reached 2 in Berman
apparently felt obligated to discuss it in their opinions. 1
No real difficulty was encountered by the state courts in applying
Berman to municipal zoning, in spite of obvious differences:
(1) In Berman the Court was dealing with the exercise of the
power of eminent domain; whereas state courts would be dealing
with the power to zone.
(2) In Berman the Court was dealing with an act of Congress,
albeit acting as the governing body of the District of Columbia in
passing the act; whereas state courts would be dealing with the
ordinances of a less potent city council.
(3) In Berman the Court was dealing with the fifth amendment; whereas state courts would be dealing with the fourteenth
amendment and the provisions of the state constitutions.
The few courts that did discuss these differences had no trouble
22
reconciling them satisfactorily.
17. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
18. Id. at 33. (Emphasis added.)
19. Agnor, Beauty Begins a Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning,
II J. PUB. L. 260, 278 (1962).
20. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 271,
69 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1955).
21. Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 41, 119 S.E.2d 833, 845 (1960); City of
Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 416, 389 P.2d 13, 17 (1964).
22. Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255, 261-62 (Ore. 1965); City of Phoenix
v. Fehlner, 90 Ariz. 13, 17, 363 P.2d 607, 609-10 (1961).
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Although Berman, and its subsequent approval by some state
courts, has undoubtedly placed promotion of aesthetic considerations
irretrievably within the scope of promotion of the general welfare,
the anticipated acceptance of aesthetics as the sole basis for municipal
zoning has, for the most part, failed to materialize.
It is doubtful that many state tribunals have grasped the meaning
of "aesthetic" or of "aesthetic zoning." 23 Evidence of this judicial
confusion is provided by the numerous cases that purport to uphold
zoning solely upon the basis of aesthetics, but mention another basis:
economic well-being.
The inclusion of economic well-being within the scope of the
general welfare has proceeded quietly and has found wide acceptance among the courts. As a concept, it is less radical and more
easily understood than aesthetics. Furthermore, it has the virtue of
measurement by the everyday standard of dollars and cents; it is
impossible to measure accurately the "irritation value" of an eyesore.
For these reasons, many courts have talked blandly about the validity
of aesthetic zoning, and then pointed out that the ordinance in question protected property values. Even in the heralded case of State
ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland,24 which allegedly
followed the Berman ruling, the Wisconsin Supreme Court based its
decision upon both aesthetics and the protection of property values.
Yet this case is frequently cited as being based solely upon aesthetic
considerations.
At least one court has given recognition to the existing confusion
regarding aesthetic zoning. The New Jersey Supreme Court said in
25
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen:
Much is said about zoning for aesthetics. If what is meant
thereby is zoning for aesthetics as an end in itself, the issue
may be said to be unexplored in our State, but if the question
is whether aesthetics may play a part in a zoning judgment,
the subject is hardly new. There are areas in which aesthetics
and economics coalesce, areas in which a discordant sight is as
hard an economic fact as an annoying odor or sound. We refer
not to some sensitive or exquisite preference but to concepts of
congruity held so widely that they are inseparable from the
enjoyment and hence the value of property.
The factor of economic well-being is brought into some decisions
by means other than the protection of property values. The other
23.
Police
24.
25.

Contra, Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the
Power, 27 So. CAL. L. REv. 149, 151 (1954).
269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
42 N.J. 1, 5, 198 A.2d 447, 449 (1964).
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favorite of the courts has been the promotion of tourism. This has
been treated in two different ways by the states involved. The first
method, of which New Hampshire 26 and Florida 2 7 cases are representative, treats certain portions of the state as areas that have an economic dependence upon the tourist industry, which the court assumes is enriched by the aesthetic appeal of the area. Thus, the
Florida Supreme Court said in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean &
Inland Co.: "It is difficult to see how the success of Miami Beach
could continue if its aesthetic appeal were ignored because the beauty
of the community is a distinct lure to the winter travelers."2s
The second approach to the use of tourism for including an economic benefit in the decision is confined to small areas that attract
tourists because of their historical significance.29 Louisiana 30 and
Massachusetts31 have employed this approach to preserve the character
of Vieux Carre and Nantucket, respectively.
32
In 1963, the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Stover,
and became the first high state court to uphold a zoning ordinance
solely upon aesthetics. This landmark case concerned an ordinance
prohibiting the maintenance of clotheslines in a front or a side yard
abutting a street. The clotheslines of those attacking the ordinance
had been erected five years before its passage as a protest against the
high municipal taxes. The court based its decision on Berman and
did not mention the need to protect property values. 33 Indeed, only
4
one vague allusion to economic well-being was made:3

Consequently, whether such a statute or ordinance should be
voided should depend upon whether the restriction was "an
arbitrary and irrational method of achieving an attractive,
efficiently functioning, prosperous community- and not upon
whether the objectives were primarily aesthetic."
Although the decision did rest solely upon aesthetic grounds, the court
was careful to make it clear that "cases may undoubtedly arise . . .
in which the legislative body goes too far in the name of aesthetics...
but the present, quite clearly is not one of them."35
26.
27.
(1941).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961).
City of Miami Beach v. Ocean 9: Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364
Id. at 487, 3 So. 2d at 367.
Comment, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 729 (1961).
City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953).
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E. 2d 557 (1955).
12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
Id. at 467, 191 N.E.2d at 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
Ibid. (Emphasis by the court.)
Id. at 468, 191 N.E.2d at 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738-39.
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In 1965, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Oregon City v. Hartke,36
upheld an ordinance that totally excluded automobile wrecking yards
37
from the city, saying:
It must be conceded that authority for the validity of
zoning for aesthetic purposes only is scant. People v. Stover...
is most directly in point with the instant case....
We join in the view "that aesthetic considerations alone
may warrant an exercise of the police power."
This case is the strongest to date from a state court in support of
aesthetic zoning, in view of the fact that the ordinance completely
prohibited a particular use of private property. 38
Thus far, only three jurisdictions have upheld the use of the
police power solely for promotion of aesthetic purposes: The District
of Columbia, New York, and Oregon.39
There are ten other jurisdictions that speak of the promotion of
aesthetics alone as a valid basis for zoning, but have yet to issue a
decision in which the aesthetic purpose is not buttressed by the promotion of economic well-being. These include: Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 40 As previously pointed out,
New Jersey has given judicial recognition to the confusion of aesthetics with economics, but the New Jersey court has not taken steps
to redefine its position in conformity with its recognition of the
confusion. 4 ' The other nine jurisdictions boldly purport to recognize
the validity of aesthetic zoning, but never fail to give their decisions
a firm basis in economic well-being. A prime example of this type
of maneuver was given by the Florida Supreme Court in Merritt v.
42
Peters:
36. 400 P.2d 255 (Ore. 1965).
37. Id. at 262.
38.

Id. at 263.

39. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191
N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963); Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 (Ore.
1965).
40. City of Phoenix v. Fehlner, 90 Ariz. 13, 363 P.2d 607 (1961); Bachman v.
State, 235 Ark. 339, 359 S.W.2d 815 (1962); Franklin Builders, Inc. v. Sartin, 25
Conn. Supp. - 207 A.2d 12 (1964); Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d
209 (Fla. 1963); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964); Opinion of
the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Opinion of
the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961); United Advertising Corp. v.
Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958); State ex reL.
Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
41. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5, 198 A.2d
447, 449 (1964).
42. 65 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla. 1953).
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We have no hesitancy in agreeing with [the plaintiff] that the
factors of health, safety and morals are not involved in restricting the proportions of a sign board, but we disagree with
him in his position that the restriction cannot be sustained
on aesthetic grounds alone.
The court, however, went on to apply the principle of the Ocean &
Inland case, in which tourism is the dominant factor in upholding a
zoning ordinance.
One can hardly blame the courts in these ten jurisdictions for
wishing to find a more solid foundation for their decisions than
aesthetics standing alone can offer; but on the other hand, one must
recoil from the confusion caused when the courts purport to accept
a concept, but then treat it as if it were inadequate.
There are at least eighteen jurisdictions in which the concept of
zoning based solely upon the promotion of aesthetic objectives has
been specifically rejected by the courts. These jurisdictions are: California, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.4 3 In
a great many of these jurisdictions the promotion of aesthetics may
be taken into consideration in the enactment of ordinances, and
aesthetic considerations may even provide the motivation for the enactment, but there must be some other purpose served by the ordinance if it is to be upheld.
The remaining jurisdictions within the United States, consisting
mainly of the sparsely populated states, have made no mention of
the validity of zoning for aesthetic purposes. It is likely that the issue
has not been before the courts in most of these states because of the
lack of comprehensive zoning plans.
43. National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375,
27 Cal. 136 (1st D.C.A. 1962); Papaioanu v. Commissioners of Rehoboth, 25 Del.
Ch. 327, 20 A.2d 447 (1941); Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 96
N.E.2d 499 (1951); Stoner McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78
N.W.2d 843 (1956); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953),
Grant v. Mayor, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957); Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn.
553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962); City of Jackson v. Bridges, 139 So. 2d 660 (Miss. 1962);
Miller v. Kansas City, 358 S.W.2d 100 (Ct. App. Mo. 1962); City of Milford v.
Schmidt, 175 Neb. 12, 120 N.W.2d 262 (1963); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964); Little Pep Delmonico Restaurant, Inc. v.
City of Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960); Reid v. Architectural Bd.
of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1963); City of Norris v.
Bradford, 204 Tenn. 319, 321 S.W.2d 543 (1959); Niday v. City of Bellaire, 251
S.W.2d 747 (Tex. 1952); Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 388 P.2d. 926
(1964); Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960).
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The confusion surrounding the law of aesthetic zoning has been
caused by those decisions that mingle economics with aesthetics in
such a manner that it is almost impossible to extract meaningful delineations. Florida has been doing this longer than any other jurisdiction, 44 and is showing no signs of changing its course. Moreover,
the Florida courts have been adding to the class denominated as
tourist areas - once the exclusive bailiwick of Miami Beach - at every
turn. Daytona Beach, 45 Sarasota, 46 and Vero Beach 47 have been specifically included during the past decade. With Florida's vast number of tourist accommodations, it seems that many more cities would
qualify as tourist areas.
As the nationwide trend toward allowance of aesthetic zoning increases, the Florida Supreme Court will come under considerable pressure to allow aesthetic zoning throughout the state. There are two
simple ways by which the court could accomplish statewide aesthetic
zoning: (1) declare the entire state a tourist area, thereby perpetuating
the confusion of aesthetic and economic bases or (2) abandon the
present link between aesthetics and tourism.48 The first alternative
seems more likely to occur because of the numerous beaches and resorts in Florida that could be used to justify such a decision and also
because declaring the entire state a tourist area would avoid judicial
retreat from the established position.
But complete abandonment of the the tourist-aesthetic basis
should not be ruled out as a possibility, for Florida has a great deal
of case law that declares that aesthetic purposes alone are sufficient
to invoke the police power.
This latter position represents the desirable approach to aesthetic
zoning for several reasons. It removes the stress on the economic
aspects of a pleasant community, and it admits that residents have
as much right to pleasant surroundings as do tourists.
Adoption of the position by Florida would have nation-wide impact and perhaps would speed the demise of the aesthetic-economic
befuddlement existing in other states, eliminating the use of fictitious
tourists and doubtful historical areas in the courts. The law itself
would be benefited by such a forthright approach.
JON AGEE

44. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364

(1941).
45.
46.
47.
48.

Abdo v. City of Daytona Beach, 148 So. 2d 598, 602 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. 1960).
Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1963).
State v. Moore's Estate, 153 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 1963) (dictum).
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